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Flast v. Cohen, decided by the Supreme Court in 1968, articulated a narrow 
exception to the general rule that merely being a taxpayer does not provide the necessary 
standing to challenge an expenditure of government funds alleged to violate the 
Constitution.  Since the time of Flast, the Court has steadily narrowed the exception, 
retreating from the underlying rationale of the Flast decision—a trend most recently 
observable in the Court’s decision in Arizona School Tuition Organization v. Winn.  This 
Note proposes a new test for taxpayer standing which aims to preserve the doctrine, 
while remedying some its ills.  Under this Note’s proposed test, taxpayer standing is 
appropriate when the following three factors are met: (1) the taxpayer’s status as a 
taxpayer bears a reasonable relationship to the challenged expenditure of government 
funds in question; (2) it is of practical necessity because the political system is 
structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy for those who object to a particular 
expenditure of government funds alleged to violate the Constitution, or the taxpayer is a 
member of the class for whom the especial benefit of a constitutional limitation is 
intended to directly run; and (3) where no other plausible party has standing to challenge 
the alleged violation, leaving it functionally irremediable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since Flast v. Cohen, the Supreme Court has held open a narrow exception to the 
general rule of standing that merely being a taxpayer is insufficient grounds to invoke the 
judicial power to challenge an expenditure of government funds alleged to violate the 
Constitution.
1
 The test articulated in Flast is that the taxpayer-plaintiff must show two 
things in order to merit standing. “First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link 
between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked,” and “[s]econdly, the 
taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the 
constitutional infringement alleged.”2 Since that case, however, the Supreme Court has 
made a steady retreat from the underlying rationale of the Flast decision by narrowing the 
scope of the exception, most recently in Arizona School Tuition Organization v. Winn.
3
 
Some members of the court (Justices Scalia and Thomas) would repudiate the decision in 
Flast altogether and completely deny taxpayer standing.
4
  
My Note focuses on a new theory of taxpayer standing that remedies the ills of 
the Flast doctrine without resorting to the extreme remedy suggested by Justices Scalia 
and Thomas.  Under this theory, taxpayer standing, which is to say, standing arising 
solely out of a plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer, is appropriate where: (1) the taxpayer’s 
status as a taxpayer bears a reasonable relationship to the expenditure of government 
funds in question; (2) it is of practical necessity because the political system is 
structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy for those who object to a particular 
expenditure of government funds alleged to violate the Constitution, or the taxpayer is a 
member of the class for whom the especial benefit of a constitutional limitation is 
intended to directly run; and,(3) where no other plausible party has standing to challenge 
the alleged violation, leaving it functionally irremediable.  
Part II of this Note discusses the current jurisprudence on taxpayer standing. Part 
III states the problem and explains why the current doctrine is problematic.  Part IV 
develops this new theory of taxpayer standing and demonstrates that it preserves the 
utility of the Flast doctrine in making the guarantees of the Constitution, especially the 
Establishment Clause, effective without falling prey to the same criticisms leveled against 
the Flast line of cases. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Article III, Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution lays out the limits of the 
judicial branch in our Constitutional system:
5
 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls;—to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two 
                                                     
1 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
2 Id. at 102.  
3 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
4 Id. at 1449-50. 
5 Justiciability does not begin and end here, however. Some limits on the judicial power are 
embedded in the notion of the relationship among the three branches of the federal government embodied in 
the Constitution and are not readily found in the Case or Controversy Clause—for example, the political 
question doctrine.  
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or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same 
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
This clause has been named the Case or Controversy Clause, and it has been read to 
impose the requirement that the judicial power of Article III courts is constitutionally 
limited to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ Chief Justice Warren characterized this clause as 
“limit[ing] the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context 
and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process,” 
and as assigning the judicial branch a particular role and scope in our tripartite system of 
governance so that it may not unduly interfere with the operations of the other branches 
of the federal government.
6
  
To ask whether an exercise of the power given to the judicial branch by our 
Constitution is proper in a given context is to ask about its justiciability.  Justiciability, as 
Chief Justice Warren writes, is “a concept of uncertain meaning and scope,” which lacks 
“fixed content,” is not “susceptible of scientific verification,” and is subject to “many 
subtle pressures” which tend to blur constitutional and policy considerations.7 To ask 
whether a particular plaintiff has standing to bring a particular claim before an Article III 
court is one way of asking whether that particular claim, in relation to that particular 
plaintiff, is justiciable (although it is not to ask whether the underlying claim is 
justiciable, for although the party at hand may not be proper, others might be).  Standing 
is often regarded as a particularly thorny problem in the law, because it is affected by the 
“same vagaries that inhere in justiciability” and often serves as shorthand for all of the 
various elements of justiciability.
8
 
These difficulties notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has generally adhered to a 
relatively simple rule for standing, synthesized and expressed in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife:  
The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three 
elements”: (1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not  
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be 
‘fairly. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant and not . . 
. th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before 
the court’”; and (3) “it must be likely as opposed to merely speculative, 
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).
9
  
While this rule generally serves to sensibly cabin judicial power and limit the judiciary’s 
ability to pass judgment in a purely advisory way, on an issue that is moot or unripe, in 
litigation that is friendly, or in cases where the controversy is feigned or collusive in 
nature, it is also seemingly hostile to the idea of taxpayer standing qua taxpayer.  Strict 
                                                     
6 Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 98. 
9 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).  
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standing requirements may even leave some otherwise justiciable claims irremediable for 
want of a party who has standing. 
The phrase “taxpayer standing” will be used in this Note to refer to the concept 
of standing to challenge an exercise of the Congressional Taxing and Spending Power 
arising solely out of the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer.  Suits which rely upon a theory of 
taxpayer standing challenge the expenditure of state or federal funds that the taxpayer 
believes violate the Constitution.  This is not the only way in which taxpayers may have 
standing to challenge federal laws or actions, of course; taxpayers may, inter alia, contest 
their tax liability or directly challenge the constitutionality of the collection of a tax.
10
 
A. Early Cases and Flast v. Cohen  
The first modern case to grapple with the issue of taxpayer standing was 
Frothingham v. Mellon, decided in 1923.
11
 In that case, Frothingham attacked a law 
passed by Congress, the Maternity Act, on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and 
would thus increase her tax burden without due process of law.
12
 The Court ruled that 
Frothingham lacked standing to pursue the action on the theory that her interest in the 
moneys of the treasury was too minute, and the effect upon her future taxation as a result 
of the expenditure of these funds was too “remote, fluctuating, and uncertain,” to permit 
an appeal to the court.
13
 They held that the case at bar was distinguishable from past 
precedents permitting a single taxpayer to “sue to enjoin an illegal use of the moneys of a 
municipal corporation” because the taxpayer’s interest there is “direct and immediate” 
and the injunction appropriate.
14
  
Underpinning the ruling was the belief that the Court did not possess the “power 
per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.” 
15
 This belief made the fine distinction that what the Court was actually doing in a case 
where the enforcement of a legal right conflicted with an unconstitutional law was 
enjoining the actions of the official, the statute notwithstanding, rather than holding the 
law itself unconstitutional.
16
 Putting aside the metaphysical complexities of the decision, 
the core ruling that merely being a taxpayer was always insufficient to challenge an act of 
Congress was well established until the case of Flast v. Cohen in 1968. 
In Flast, taxpayers sued to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds to purchase 
materials for parochial schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965 on the grounds that such expenditure was contrary to the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.
17
 The Court ruled that the taxpayers in this case had standing, 
overruling what was thought to be a broad prohibition on taxpayer standing from 
Frothingham, relying primarily upon the unique nature of the Establishment Clause.
18
 In 
the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Warren noted that the decision in Frothingham 
could be read to express either a constitutional prohibition on taxpayer suits or pragmatic 
considerations of judicial self-restraint.
19
 Given the reasons provided in Frothingham, 
                                                     
10 Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944). 
11 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 487.  
14 Id. at 486. 
15 Id. at 488.  
16 Id. 
17 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-87 (1968). 
18 Id. at 103-04. 
19 Id. at 92-93. 
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that the taxpayer interest was minute or remote, and that allowing the suit to continue 
would open the floodgates of litigation, the latter was the more sound reading.
20
 The 
Court found no general constitutional bar to taxpayer suits but laid out two factors, which 
must be satisfied for such suits to proceed to address the concerns expressed in 
Frothingham. “First[ly], the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and 
the type of legislative enactment attacked,” and “[s]econdly, the taxpayer must establish a 
nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement 
alleged.”21 The first arm of the test is to ensure that a taxpayer may only challenge the 
constitutionality of exercises of the Taxing and Spending Clause.
22
 Therefore, taxpayers 
do not have standing to challenge incidental expenditures of funds ancillary to the 
administration of essentially regulatory statutes.
23
 The second arm of the test demands 
that the taxpayer show that the challenged law exceeds a specific constitutional limitation 
put on the exercise of the Taxing and Spending Power, not merely that the law is 
generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress.
24
 Simply put, the taxpayer’s claim in 
these cases must be that his or her tax money was “extracted and spent in violation of 
specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.”25 
In Flast, the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment specifically limited the Taxing and Spending Power conferred on Congress 
by Article I, Section 8.
26
  In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated that the 
taxpayers seemed to present the same issues of minuteness and remoteness as those in 
Frothingham, but were nonetheless permitted to go on with their suit.  This was based on 
the theory that the Establishment Clause is special insofar as it was intended to prohibit 
the expenditure of, to use James Madison’s words, even “three pence” of personal 
taxpayer money to fund the establishment of a state religion, to favor one religion over 
another, or even to support religion in general.
27
 Although Chief Justice Warren was 
careful to note that his decision did not foreclose the possibility of other specific 
limitations on the Taxing and Spending Power being later announced,
28
 his ruling and the 
concurrence by Justice Fortas, who doubted whether there were any other types of 
Congressional expenditures which could be challenged by a litigant solely on the basis of 
being a taxpayer,
29
 cemented the Establishment Clause as a special part of the 
Constitution for the purpose of taxpayer standing. 
B. Hein, Winn, and the Development of the Flast Exception  
In the time since Flast, a number of rulings have been handed down which show 
a general retreat, holding that most taxpayer suits are barred for lack of standing in 
somewhat varying procedural postures.  These cases include Hein v. Freedom From 
Religion Foundation, in which no standing was found where a taxpayer attempted to 
challenge federal executive actions funded by general appropriations;
30
 and Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, in which 
                                                     
20 Id. at 93. 
21 Id. at 102-03. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
23 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 103-05. 
24 See Id. at 104-05. 
25 Id. at 106. 
26 See Id. 
27 Id. at 104.  
28 Id. at 105.  
29 Id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
30 551 U.S. 587 (2007).  
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standing was also denied where a taxpayer attempted to challenge an agency decision to 
transfer federal land pursuant to the Property Clause.
31
 Scholarly commentary has been 
mixed on the influence of Flast and the meaning of the subsequent case law.
32
 Specific 
limitations on the Congressional power to tax and spend were not found in the Statement 
and Account Clause
33
 or the Incompatibility Clause.
34
  
In Hein, the Court held that federal expenditures by means of executive 
discretion to spend from a general Congressional appropriation did not permit suits 
predicated upon taxpayer standing.
35
 In the majority opinion, Justice Alito reasoned that 
when the challenged expenditures “were not expressly authorized or mandated by any 
specific congressional enactment,” the resulting “lawsuit is not directed at an exercise of 
congressional power . . . and thus lacks the requisite ‘logical nexus’ between taxpayer 
status ‘and the type of legislative enactment attacked.’”36 This was distinguished from a 
previous case in which the Court found a sufficient nexus between the taxpayer’s status 
as a taxpayer and a congressional exercise of the Taxing and Spending Power when 
administrative disbursements were made pursuant to an agency’s particular statutory 
mandate.
37
 The Court declined to extend the holding in Flast, which was focused solely 
upon congressional action, to discretionary Executive Branch expenditures or to 
government spending as a whole on the theory that Flast was a “narrow exception” to the 
general bar on taxpayer standing which sensibly cabins taxpayer suits.
38
 Alito argues that 
the facts of Hein make clear that the Flast decision correctly prohibits taxpayers from 
challenging speeches, proclamations, and conferences which otherwise praise religion or 
the activity of religious people and organizations to prevent federal courts from 
“superintend[ing], at the behest of any federal taxpayer, the speeches, statements, and 
myriad daily activities of the President, his staff, and other Executive Branch officials,” 
or from turning the federal courts into “forums for taxpayers ‘generalized grievances’ 
about the conduct of government.” 39  Finally, Justice Alito acknowledges that if the 
Executive Branch were to use the funds from a general appropriation to say, build a 
church or hire clergy, then this ruling does not preclude all potential challenges, as there 




Justice Kennedy, concurring in the decision, echoed Justice Alito’s concern that 
an expansion of Flast to Executive Branch expenditures pursuant to general 
congressional appropriations would lead to undesirable “constant intrusion upon the 
                                                     
31 454 U.S. 464 (1982).  
32 See Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation of Claims: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 
YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (arguing that Snyder vitiates Flast); Joel Fifield, No Taxation without Separation: The 
Supreme Court Passes on an Opportunity to End Establishment Clause Exceptionalism: Hein v. Freedom 
From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2533 (2007), 31 Harv. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1195, 1207 (arguing that 
Hein was a missed opportunity to unify taxpayer standing law); Note, Standing in the Mud: Hein v. Freedom 
From Religion Foundation, Inc., 42 AKRON L. REV. 1277, 1278 (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
continually provided “perplexing decisions in taxpayer standing cases”).  
33 U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
34 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).  
35 Hein, 551 U.S. at 608-09. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 606-08. 
38 Id. at 608-09. 
39 Id. at 611-12.  
40 Id. at 614.  
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executive realm.”41 His concurrence adds the further insight that even where parties have 
no standing to sue, members of the Legislative and Executive Branches “are not excused 
from making constitutional determinations in the regular course of their duties,” and they 
“must make a conscious decision to obey the Constitution whether or not their acts can be 
challenged in a court of law and then must conform their actions to these principled 
determinations.”42 
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, argues that the Court has two choices 
in the present matter: (1) Flast “should be applied (at minimum) to all challenges to the 
governmental expenditure of a general tax revenues in a manner alleged to violate a 
constitutional provision, specifically limiting the taxing and spending power”; or (2) 
“Flast should be repudiated.”43  Justice Scalia argues that Flast should be repudiated 
because both the ‘wallet injury’ and ‘psychic injury’ theories do not work. Sufficiently 
alleging a ‘wallet injury’ is infeasible because it would require satisfying the traceability 
and redressability prongs of the standing analysis by showing that the plaintiff’s tax bill 
would have been lower had the allegedly forbidden expenditure not been made and that 
the government will, “in response to an adverse court decision, lower taxes rather than 
spend the funds in some other manner.”44 On the psychic injury, such a theory does not 
work because a “taxpayer’s purely psychological displeasure that his funds are being 
spent in an allegedly unlawful manner” cannot ever be “sufficiently concrete and 
particularized to support Article III standing.” 45  This is the case because taxpayers 
seeking relief that is not concrete and particularized by alleging only general grievances 
can only expect relief that “no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the 
public at large.”46 These grievances, he argues, have their remedy in the political process, 
not through the courts. 
In his dissent, Justice Souter echoed Justice Scalia’s argument that there was no 
principled reason not to extend the Flast decision, if it is good law, to Executive Branch 
expenditures.  As the Establishment Clause applies just as equally to Executive Branch 
expenditures as it does to legislative exercises of the Taxing and Spending Power, to 
permit Executive Branch use of appropriated funds to accomplish an unconstitutional end 
would mean that “Establishment Clause protection would melt away.”47 Where Justice 
Souter and Justice Scalia differ is on the issue of whether Flast should be abandoned or 
maintained. Justice Souter argued that to deny standing because of the vagueness of the 
plaintiff’s injury in these cases would repudiate prior case law which held, for example, 
that “being forced to compete on an uneven playing field based on race (without showing 
that an economic loss resulted)” or “living in a racially gerrymandered electoral district” 
was sufficient for standing, even though these injuries were no more concrete than seeing 
one’s tax dollars spent on religion.48 To deny standing in these cases, he implies, is to fail 
to grasp the subtleties of intangible harms and is to repudiate the sensible conclusion the 
                                                     
41 Id. at 617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
42 Id. at 618.  
43 Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
44 Id. at 619.  
45 Id. at 633.  
46 Id. at 634.  
47 Id. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
48 Id. at 642.  
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court drew in Flast: “[W]hen the Government spends money for religious purposes a 
taxpayer’s injury is serious enough to be ‘judicially cognizable.’”49  
The most recent ruling on the matter came in Arizona School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn,
50
 where the Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge 
a system of tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations (STOs), which 
provide scholarships for students attending private schools, many of which are 
religious.
51
 Taxpayers alleged that the system of STO tax credits violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment (as applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). In the opinion of the court, Justice Kennedy held that the 
taxpayers did not meet the conditions of the Flast exception permitting standing. Justice 
Kennedy read Flast to demand that money be extracted and spent in order for taxpayers 
to have standing, and that in the case of tax credits, a credit is not sufficiently like 
extraction and spending to justify use of the exception.  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy argued that tax credits do not implicate individual 
taxpayers in sectarian activities.  Unlike Flast (where a dissenting taxpayer knows that 
his or her money is being extracted and spent to contribute to an establishment in 
violation of his or her conscience) a tax credit does not extract and spend a conscientious 
dissenter’s funds in violation of the Establishment Clause or force a taxpayer to give up 
even three pence of his property for such a project.  In the case of tax credits, the taxpayer 
lacks a sufficient connection between his or her status as a taxpayer and the injury 
because the causal connection between the dissenting taxpayer and the alleged 
establishment is nonexistent and any financial injury remains speculative.  Taxpayers 
here failed to give the necessary causal story of the injury. While the State makes STOs 
possible, private citizens set up the STOs and contribute to them, and the STOs 
themselves decide where to allocate funds (and some STOs are non-sectarian).  In this 
way, private individuals make the choice to support religious institutions, rather than the 
government (it is not “fairly traceable to the government” 52).  Any injunction against the 
STO system would reduce the funding to the STOs in question but would not affect tax 
liabilities of taxpayers who choose not to contribute to a religious STO.  The injunction 
would, therefore, not redress the putative injury, and the plaintiffs would lack standing.  
Justice Kennedy reads cases since Flast to have confirmed Justice Fortas’s 
statement that taxpayer standing should only be permitted in the case of the 
Establishment Clause.
53
  Although cases like Winn reached the merits without being 
dismissed for lack of standing (including a previous incarnation of the Winn case which 
went all the way up to the Supreme Court), Justice Kennedy argues that those cases do 
not mention standing, and therefore should not be taken to have anything material to say 
about standing, relying upon the proposition that “[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect 
is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the 
proposition that no defect existed.”54 
                                                     
49 Id. at 643 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). 
50 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
51 Taxpayers may give $500 for individuals and $1000 for married couples to an STO of their 
choice and receive a tax credit.  96% of STOs support parochial schools. Id. at 1448.  
52 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 1448-49; see infra Part III (b), for a fuller discussion of unacknowledged jurisdictional 
defects.  
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Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined concurring in the opinion, 
argues that this whole line of jurisprudence is misconceived and that he would overrule 
Flast thereby removing any exceptions permitting standing.  The concurrence is scarcely 
a paragraph long, but Justice Scalia, in that space, argues that “[u]nder a principled 
reading of Article III, [the struggles the majority and dissent have in ruling] are 
unnecessary” because “Flast is an anomaly in our jurisprudence, irreconcilable with the 
Article III restrictions on federal judicial power that our opinions have established.”55 
Therefore, he would “repudiate that misguided decision and enforce the Constitution.”56 
In her dissent, Justice Kagan argues that the majority is hopelessly formalistic to 
the point of reading the Flast decision out of the law, at least for clever lawmakers.
57
 The 
thrust of her argument is that, if Flast is to be taken seriously, tax expenditures (tax 
credits, targeted tax breaks, and the like) cannot be treated any differently than 
appropriations because they are functionally the same.
58
 Different treatment in courts 
would permit a legislative body to easily switch between them to avoid an Establishment 
Clause challenge, allowing them to do an end-run around the Flast decision.
59
 Justice 
Kagan criticizes the central distinction the majority makes between “extraction and 
spending” and tax expenditure as relying upon a cherry-picked notion of what the Flast 
decision purports to say.  She argues that Flast does not mean to say that taxpayers have 
to be able to directly trace any one particular tax dollar which they have paid to the 
government to an improper funding of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause 
in order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the expenditure.
60
 Rather, in 
her opinion, all a taxpayer must do is claim that the government has exercised the Taxing 
and Spending Power in violation of the Establishment Clause.
61
 The taxpayer need not 
directly trace any particular tax dollar that he or she has paid to the challenged 
disbursement because the evil that the Establishment Clause means to prevent has already 
happened – namely, that the Taxing and Spending Power has been used to favor one 
religion over another, or to promote religion generally.  
Justice Kagan argues that the Winn holding permitting the government to cloak 
their social agenda as a tax expenditure instead of an appropriation to avoid the threat of 
challenge from taxpayers is just as absurd as holding that a taxpayer would be barred 
from challenging an exercise of the Taxing and Spending Power if the government 
agreed to not use that particular taxpayer’s dollars to fund religion.62 In either scenario, 
the harm which the Establishment Clause meant to prevent has been accomplished 
because regardless of whose taxpayer money is spent, the government has used it to 
establish religion.
63
 Bolstering this argument is the historical point that the particular tax 
which James Madison, the architect of the Establishment Clause, objected to so 
vehemently when he wrote Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
was exactly this sort of tax.
64
 The tax at issue there allowed those objecting to 
government funding for religious schools to opt out and put their tax dollars into a fund 
                                                     
55 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 1455.  
59 Id. at 1451.  
60 Id. at 1459.  
61 Id. at 1451.  
62 Id. at 1459.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1461.  
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the government would use to support non-religious county schools.
65
 Although the 
particulars may differ slightly between this case and that at issue in Winn, the intuitive 
force of the analogy is strong.  As was the case in Madison’s time, in Winn an individual 
objecting taxpayer’s money will not go to support a religious school, but the government 
is still using the tax system to establish religion. 
III. THE PROBLEM 
This section describes the premise of this Note, namely, that taxpayer standing as 
a doctrine is constitutionally permissible but broken in its present form and therefore in 
need of a new formulation.  Part A outlines the contrary position that taxpayer standing 
should never be permitted.  Part B discusses previous taxpayer standing cases, which 
have been allowed to proceed to final judgment where jurisdictional defects were allowed 
to pass sub silentio.  Part C briefly outlines the result if taxpayer standing is wholly 
disallowed: that there may well be no remedy for aggrieved taxpayers in certain 
situations. 
A. No Taxpayer Standing 
Some jurists and commentators believe that taxpayer standing is never 
permissible.
66
 The consistent refrain from this camp has been that taxpayer standing is 
inconsistent with the constitutionally irreducible minimums that have been developed 
through the Court’s Article III jurisprudence.67 Plaintiffs are thought, generally, to have 
two lines of argument when it comes to alleging an injury in these cases.  First, they can 
allege that they have suffered real financial harm because their tax bill would actually be 
lower if the challenged conduct were to be enjoined.  The Supreme Court has been quick 
to reject this argument as grasping and speculative because taxpayers have not been held 
to have a sufficiently large interest in the federal treasury to permit standing out of a 
concern for the fisc.
68
 Furthermore, the Court has been skeptical that the government 
would lower taxes as a result of any judicial action, making the specific tax burden 
argument unworkable.
69
 If the challenged conduct were to be enjoined, the government 
may create a different but similar program or may simply choose to spend the funds 
somewhere else.  Either way, it is highly speculative to say that the overall tax burden of 
any taxpayer would be lower. The court aptly makes these points in Frothingham.
70
  
Second, plaintiffs may allege a psychic injury arising out of a violation of the 
Establishment Clause (or other part of the Constitution).
71
 Critics of taxpayer standing 
have argued that this injury is not concrete and particularized enough to justify standing 
(in that relief would not particularly benefit any one taxpayer any more than any other 
citizen), and that the taxpayer really only expresses a general grievance about the 
operation of government.
72
 The argument goes that general grievances should not be 
resolved in the judiciary, but rather through the political process.
73
 
                                                     
65 Id.  
66 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (repudiating taxpayer standing doctrine entirely). 
67 Id.   
68 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Hein, 551 U.S. at 619. 
72 Id. at 593.  
73 Id. at 636. 
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Many of the arguments for eliminating taxpayer standing, like much of the 
standing doctrine, blend constitutional and pragmatic concerns seldom differentiating one 
from the other.
74
 Insofar as a constitutional barrier is concerned, little attention has been 
given to the constitutional terms of “cases” and “controversies.”75 This is not altogether 
surprising, as the limitations on standing contained in the Constitution are broadly put 
and require a good deal of work to be defined.
76
 Given the vagueness of the Constitution 
on this point, it is almost certainly true that the Framers intended the judiciary to come up 
with a doctrine, perhaps grounded in the historical common-law, that attempts to outline 
the contours of a case or controversy such that law suits can be sensibly cabined. It is an 
open question whether courts should follow this implicit invitation and attempt to move 
beyond the words “case” or “controversy” to consider pragmatic concerns, or attempt to 
parse their “true” meaning through explication of the constitutional text.  
Even if it is agreed that “case” or “controversy” should be the beginning and end 
points for standing, it is certainly not implausible to think that the constitutionally 
irreducible minimums that the court has identified for standing are implicit in the words 
“case” or “controversy” themselves, such that weighing pragmatic and other concerns 
when deciding on standing is proper constitutional law.
77
 Acknowledging that the 
Framers may have intended, or that the Constitution and common sense likely compel, 
the weighing of pragmatic concerns in determining whether something should be labeled 
a “case” or “controversy” apt to adjudication in the courts, those who argue against 
taxpayer standing by eliding the distinction between pragmatic and “constitutional” 
(meaning a formalistic reading of the words “case” or “controversy” themselves) should 
not be condemned out of hand, because those arguments may well be one and the same.  
This Note’s new theory of taxpayer standing uses pragmatic reasoning in interpreting 
Article III’s standing requirements to cabin the doctrine of taxpayer standing itself by 
weighing prudential reasons.  Therefore it would be subject to similar criticism if 
considering such pragmatic concerns were not justified.
78
  
B. Unacknowledged Jurisdictional Defects 
That a number of cases likely having jurisdictional defects have been allowed to 
proceed to judgment on the merits without mention of the standing issue is a key 
indicator of the weakness in the current taxpayer standing doctrine.
79
 Despite the general 
proposition that the Court has “an obligation to assure [itself] of litigants’ standing under 
Article III,”80 the current position of the Supreme Court concerning these cases is that, 
“when questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this 
                                                     
74 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).  
75 Justice Scalia’s citation to de Tocqueville in the Hein case aside. See infra note 82. 
76 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX L. REV. 1753 
(exploring the validity of pluralism in constitutional interpretation, suggesting that no one mode of 
interpretation will ever suffice). 
77 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). 
78 See U.S. CONST. art. III,(the necessity of consideration of pragmatic concerns in Part III.D, infra). 
79 See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (holding that Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not bar 
taxpayer suit, without mentioning taxpayer standing issue); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) 
(permitting taxpayers to challenge constitutionality of a tax deduction without mentioning standing issue); 
Comm. for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (permitting taxpayer challenge to 
school aid statute without mentioning standing issue); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (permitting 
taxpayer challenge to South Carolina statutory scheme of aid to colleges without mentioning standing); Walz 
v. Tax Comm. of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (permitting realty owner to challenge, on a 
taxpayer theory, tax exemptions for religious organizations without mentioning standing).  
80 DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006).  
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Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the 
jurisdictional issue before us.”81 This means that “[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect 
is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the 
proposition that no defect existed.” 82  Justice Kennedy has justified this position 
practically, arguing “the Court would risk error if it relied on assumptions that have gone 
unstated and unexamined.”83  
All of that notwithstanding, the patchy application of this jurisdictional barrier 
presents some evidence of implicit disagreement or confusion concerning the present 
doctrine.
84
 If the doctrine of taxpayer standing that has grown out of Flast really were so 
clear, then courts should have no problem applying the relevant standard, especially when 
doing so would reduce the burden on all parties by dismissing litigation at the very outset 
of cases.  Poor conformity with what appears to be a relatively simple rule, in spirit at 
least, is evidence for one or both of the following two propositions: (1) Flast is 
confusing, and therefore is not applied when it should be; or (2) Flast does not conform 
with intuitive notions of justice, and therefore its poor application indicates implicit 
disagreement with its holding.
85
 It is difficult to divine which of these two forces is at 
work in any particular case. Either way, the consistent ability for jurisdictional defects to 
pass sub silentio indicates that the current doctrine is broken.   
This idea is supported by the failure of the Supreme Court to rule on the issue of 
taxpayer standing in Hibbs, when the case first came before the Court. The Court held 
that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.
86
 Justice Kennedy deals with this 
shortcoming in Hibbs’s second iteration using a mere in-line citation: “cf. Hibbs v. Winn, 
542 U.S. 88, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (reaching only threshold jurisdictional 
issues).”87 This is both an unsatisfying explanation of what happened in the first iteration 
and an invitation to ask whether some jurisdictional issues are not threshold issues.  It is 
absurd to attempt to define a jurisdictional barrier imposed by statute
88
 as somehow 
logically prior to one embedded in the Constitution itself. If the basic requirements laid 
out in Article III were not satisfied, it is impossible to see how the Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act matters at all—the case should simply have been dismissed for lack of standing. 
Hibbs v. Winn would have been the perfect time to indicate that the plaintiffs’ first trip to 
the Supreme Court was all for naught, regardless of the applicability of the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act, because they lacked standing to bring their claim anyway.
89
 Instead, the 
decision does not address the issue of standing. In fact, in none of the three opinions 
which were filed does the word ‘standing’ appear at all.  If the judicial sensibilities of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court were so offended by the specter of taxpayer standing in the 
second time around, it is baffling that none of them had anything to say about it the first 
                                                     
81 Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974).  
82 Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011). 
83 Id. at 1449.  
84 See, e.g., Jeff Todd, Undead Precedent: The Curse of a Holding ‘Limited to its Facts,’ 40 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 67 (explaining that decisions are sometimes limited to their facts because of a later judicial 
determination that they were wrongly decided).  
85 Id. 
86 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004). 
87 Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011). 
88 Hibbs, 542 U.S. 88 (2004). was concerned with the applicability of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act 
to the same facts.  
89 Remember the principle laid out in DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006), 
which said that the Court must assure itself of litigants’ standing under Article III.  
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time the case came before the Court.  It is especially remarkable given the limited number 
of cases the Court takes on.  There is a slim likelihood that the same plaintiffs would 
reach the Court twice, much less to resolve yet another jurisdictional question. 
C. Unavailability of Other Remedies 
Taxpayer standing may be an imperfect doctrine, but it is necessary in certain 
situations because of the unavailability of other remedies.  Take, for example, the case of 
the tax credits at issue in Winn.
90
 If the plaintiffs there are prohibited from bringing suit to 
challenge the tax credit, there are no other parties with proper standing.  The Acting 
Solicitor General for the United States, as amicus curiae in support of the petitioner 
Arizona School Tuition Organization, acknowledged this fact at oral argument in front of 
the Supreme Court.
91
 As no other direct procedural or administrative remedy is available, 
the only remedy has to come from the political process.  There are good arguments 
supporting the proposition that general grievances against the government should not be 
adjudicated in the courts.  Allowing general grievances to be adjudicated in courts could 
result in turning the judiciary into a constant, overreaching, and odious monitor of the 
functioning of the other branches of government.
92
 However, the political process should 
not be entrusted with remedying all ills.  If the conduct at issue truly violates the 
Establishment Clause, and is the functional equivalent of conduct which could fairly be 
challenged in court, it would be to exalt form over substance and effectively abdicate the 





A. Why Have Taxpayer Standing At All? 
Before laying out any theory of taxpayer standing, it is necessary to refute the 
argument that Justice Scalia voices in Winn and Hein that taxpayer standing should not 
exist at all because the injury alleged in such cases is not concrete and particularized, but 




The contention that the injury alleged in taxpayer standing cases is not concrete 
and particularized is foundationally weak and fails to grasp the real crux of taxpayer 
                                                     
90 Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436.  
91 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (No. 
09-987).  
92 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007). 
93 The effect of the Winn decision can be seen in state taxpayer standing doctrine. For example, in 
Missouri there is reason to believe that the doctrine has been tightened in conformity with the majority’s 
reasoning in Winn to disallow taxpayer suits. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656 (Mo. banc 2011) 
(holding that taxpayers did not having standing to challenge redeveloper tax credit as a matter of Missouri 
constitutional law, relying upon Winn). 
94 Hein, 551 U.S. at 633-634. This, of course, is tantamount to saying that there is no “case” or 
“controversy” here. Justice Scalia is content to let Alexis de Tocqueville do some of the arguing in an 
important passage in Hein where he quotes de Tocqeuville as having written that “judicial censure, exercised 
by the courts on legislation, cannot extend without distinction to all laws, for there are some of them that can 
never give rise to the sort of clearly formulated dispute that one calls a case.” A. de Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America 97 (H. Mansfied & D. Winthrop transls. and eds. 2000). Justice Scalia, realizing that by 
repudiating the Flast doctrine wholly he is saying that there is no case here, throws the onus onto this de 
Tocqueville quote in the Hein case rather than say it himself. Three points bear making: (1) what de 
Tocqueville wrote should have no bearing upon what the Supreme Court thinks of taxpayer standing, (2) he 
wrote in French, and (3) he may well have been speaking metaphorically about whether you can call certain 
suits “cases.”  
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standing cases. To allege that the government has used its funds to violate the 
Establishment Clause is both concrete, in that it identifies a real, albeit intangible harm, 
and particularized, in that the harm is being worked upon the individual taxpayer.
95
 As 
Justice Souter argues in Hein, standing was conferred in cases where parties were being 
forced to compete on an uneven playing field as a result of race (with no corresponding 
economic loss) or were harmed by living in a gerrymandered district.
96
 These examples 
surely represent no more concrete harms than seeing the government spend tax dollars in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.  Merely because the harm is being distributed 
amongst all taxpayers does not mean that the injury is not “particularized.” Connecting 
particularity with generality is a poor way of conceptualizing the animating spirit of the 
particularity requirement because it foists a false dichotomy on readers—“particular” 
versus “general.” The opposite of “particular” is not “general”; rather, it is “nonspecific.”  
Harms can be both general and particular if they affect all people equally. 
It is not irrational to say that where all taxpayers are harmed equally, they all 
possess standing because they have suffered individually, and therefore have a 
particularized injury, although the conduct complained of afflicts them all in common. 
Holding that particular is incommensurate with general is like saying that the victims of a 
mass tort have only suffered a general and not particularized harm.  Each individual 
victim has suffered a particular injury as a result of the tortious conduct, although it may 
well affect each in the class of affected persons equally.  If an injury is not particular that 
really means it is nonspecific, which is to say that it is unclear if the plaintiff who has 
brought the suit has suffered a specifically personal and cognizable injury.  Some psychic 
harms, like those arising from violations of the Establishment Clause, are both specified, 
in that they are individualized and are alleged with particular facts, and are cognizable, in 
that they represent a violation of a legally recognized right. In such cases, the harm is 
particularized. When the harm is a general psychic harm, but a person has not 
individually suffered that harm, then the harm is not sufficiently particular to that person. 
Although the conduct may well have been sufficient to engender real harm, it has not 
done so for that person.
97
 
On Justice Scalia’s point that general grievances should not be aired in court, 
plaintiffs in taxpayer standing suits are indeed presenting broad complaints about the 
                                                     
95 See, William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing and the 
Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 232. (arguing for a robust understanding of cognizable 
harms, including psychic harms in the case of the Establishment Clause).  
96 Hein, 551 U.S. at 642. 
97 See, Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). One might say, in response 
to this, that merely pleading that you have suffered the requisite psychic harm is enough to get over this 
hurdle. That may be correct. However, this does not mean that violations of the Establishment Clause or other 
parts of the Constitution which cause purely intangible and psychic harms should therefore not be cognizable 
(see supra note 90)—these cases just present situations in which the ‘particular’ harm requirement is not 
particularly high. In some cases, alleging particular harm, like in the case of a mass tort where a plaintiff 
alleges physical injury will present a real hurdle, in that the plaintiff will have to show that he or she has 
suffered the complained of injury. Merely because the “particularized” injury requirement may not present a 
serious hurdle in taxpayer standing cases is not a good reason to deny standing. Justice Breyer ably makes 
some of the points I make in this section in Federal Elections Commission v. Akins: “Often the fact that an 
interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, 
and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’” In other words, 
generality does not disqualify a claim; the abstractness which often goes with it creates the problem. Justice 
Breyer also makes the analogy to mass tort claims and interference with voting rights claims as examples of 
generalized harms which are nonetheless concrete enough to confer standing. 
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manner in which the government is spending money, but they are coupled with an 
individualized complaint about how their tax dollars are spent and comes in a special 
context.  Insofar as taxpayers, and not citizens at large, may properly possess standing to 
challenge an exercise of the Taxing and Spending Power or other expenditure of 
government funds, their status as a taxpayer guarantees that there is a direct relationship 
between that status and the complained of injury. When these complaints arise in the 
context of the Establishment Clause, taxpayers can only allege a grievance which is 
general because the establishment of religion is not an act which is typically targeted, in 
any meaningful sense at least, at a particular person or group of persons.  It would be 
nonsensical to hold that complaints which can be characterized as “general” cannot be 
used to challenge conduct alleged to violate the Establishment Clause because that would 




Reduced to its simplest form, Justice Scalia’s argument is that the judiciary lacks 
the power to invalidate exercises of the Taxing and Spending Power that violate the 
Establishment Clause because there is no perfect party to bring suit and remedy the 
violation. What this argument fails to grasp is the fundamental difference between proper 
taxpayer standing cases and the general class of cases where the perfect party to bring 
suit cannot be found.  In the latter cases, the inability to find the proper plaintiff suggests 
that there has been no harm,
99
 and in the former cases, the inability to find the proper 
plaintiff suggests that the harm is not one which is easily cognizable. 
If tax expenditures and appropriations are functional equivalents,
100
 the 
conclusion follows that the harm that each can cause is the same.
101
 The only problem is 
that it is difficult to attach the harm to a particular citizen. In some cases, this difficulty 
will be enough to bar suit because the harm complained of is not the proper type of harm 
(e.g., when Congress passes a poorly conceived and injurious law that is nevertheless 
constitutional) or because the harm is de minimis, and thus is not felt by any particular 
citizen acutely enough (e.g., expenditures to religious institutions in pursuit of a 
legitimate regulatory regime).
102
 However, there are cases where the harm complained of 
is uniquely constitutional and of the proper magnitude, but for which there is no perfect 
plaintiff to bring suit.
103
 In these cases, it would be sensible to have a doctrine that 
permits taxpayers qua taxpayers to challenge unconstitutional exercises of the Taxing and 
Spending Power when there is no other remedy reasonably available.  
                                                     
98 Justice Ginsburg aptly makes this point in the oral argument of Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
99 See, e.g., U.S. v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (re-affirming the prohibition against 
advisory opinions because they fail to present a “clash of adversary argument”).  
100 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1455. 
101 Courts should be careful not to dismiss Establishment Clause harms as those which arise from 
the paranoid delusions or political machinations of religious zealots and militant atheists. See Marshall, et. al., 
supra note 96, at 232-47 (explaining how the Establishment Clause was designed to protect against psychic 
injury and elucidating the types of cognizable psychic injury, including denominational harms, “corruption” 
harms, and others).   
102 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).   
103 See, e.g., Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1455 (holding that even assuming the taxpayers were sufficiently 
harmed, issues of redressability and causation pre-empted the court from finding that the taxpayers had 
standing). 
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It can be said in response to this contention that suits predicated upon taxpayer 
standing are really just advisory opinions masquerading as legitimate suits.
104
 To that, 
there are two retorts.  First, in cases where the Taxing and Spending Power is being 
challenged by a taxpayer solely upon the basis of his or her taxpayer status, there is a 
reasonably direct link between the complained of behavior (uses of government funds or 
preferences) and the plaintiff’s taxpayer status. Whatever else may be said about them, 
these suits are not purely advisory.
105
 Second, any impression that these suits are asking 
for decisions which are advisory, and thereby asking the judiciary to unduly encroach 
upon the legitimate domain of the legislature, is a result of the unique nature of the harm 
and not because of judicial overreach.  In many situations, the legislature has manipulated 
the system, whether consciously or not, to make it difficult to identify a suitable plaintiff.  
However, the essential character of the violation has not changed, whether it is classified 
as a tax credit or tax expenditure (or any other like switch).  There is no reason to think 
the types of conduct taxpayers have heretofore challenged invoke a particularly sensitive 
domain that the judiciary should label non-justiciable.  Allowing pedestrian tax 
expenditures to be unchallengeable is to exalt form over substance and to unduly shackle 
the judiciary to rank formalism. 
B. Non-Justiciability 
Rather than create an exception to the standing doctrine, some would simply 
leave many questions that can be reached only by allowing taxpayer standing (e.g., the 
tax credit in Winn)
106
 outside of the reach of the courts—which is to say, non-
justiciable.
107
 This argument invokes the strong form of justiciability, that the underlying 
controversy is simply something that the judiciary is not competent to rule upon, rather 
than the weak form of justiciability, that the proper parties are not before the court or that 
the issue is unripe or moot, but not that the underlying issue is non-justiciable.
108
 An 
advisory opinion may, of course, touch upon political questions that are themselves non-
justiciable, but their major weakness is that they are non-justiciable in the weak form 
because the proper party is not present although the underlying issue is suitable for 
adjudication in the courts.  Casting taxpayer standing cases as falling prey to the same 
objections as advisory opinions fails to recognize that the characterization has transmuted 
a relatively weak form of non-justiciability (one that is concerned about the messenger) 
into a much stronger one (one that precludes any discussion of the message).  Unlike the 
prohibition on advisory opinions generally, a characterization of taxpayer standing as 
advisory would lead to the preclusion of litigating the underlying issue.  This is not to say 
                                                     
104 Advisory opinions are not permissible as a matter of the oldest and highest authority, 
notwithstanding the English practice. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408, 409 (1792) (holding that the Attorney 
General could not solicit the Supreme Court, ex officio and without an application from any particular 
person, for a writ of mandamus to compel the execution of an act of Congress); JOHN JAY, CORRESPONDENCE 
& PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, Vol. 3, 486-89. (Henry P. Johnston, A.M. ed., 1st ed., 1891). 
105 See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 603, 644 (1992) (arguing that the term “advisory opinion” has been used widely and confusingly to 
discuss both a constitutional bar and a pragmatic bar, but that the only constitutional bar to advisory opinions 
comes in the case of pre-enactment/pre-action review or a political question and that decisions in cases of 
mootness, un-ripeness, and lack of standing are not constitutionally barred).  
106 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1436. 
107 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007). 
108 See Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129-138 (2007) (arguing 
that mootness, ripeness, advisory opinions, and standing are non-justiciable in a weaker way than the political 
question doctrine in a purpose-based approach to justiciability).  
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that there would be no remedy for the grievances taxpayers assert in these cases; the 
remedy would just have to be political in some fashion.
109
 
There is good reason to think that not all constitutional questions are justiciable.  
The issue must be ripe and not moot, the parties truly adverse, and the issue not solely 
hypothetical (which is to say, not advisory).
110
 Outside of these, there are good reasons 
for invoking the strong form of non-justiciability.  In the Supreme Court’s political 
question jurisprudence, it has identified six factors for determining whether an issue 
should not be decided upon in the courts: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”; (3) “the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (5) “an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”; or (6) “the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question.”111 The following have been found to be political questions not apt to 
adjudication in the courts: what constitutes a republican form of government under the 
Guarantee Clause,
112
 what constitutes an Indian tribe,
113
 the mode of amending the 
federal Constitution,
114
 and the nature of impeachments.
115
 
As they relate to taxpayer standing, none of these six factors weigh towards 
invoking a strong form of non-justiciability with respect to those underlying issues that 
can only be reached through taxpayer standing suits.  As a threshold matter, the second 
factor, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, is merely judicial lip-
service to the idea of a restrained judiciary and has no real meaning.  As the Court has 
succeeded in giving meaning to nebulous concepts like “due process,” 116  what lurks 
within the Ninth Amendment,
117
 and the shadows and penumbras cast by the various 
constitutional amendments,
118
 it is not unreasonable to think that a judicial standard for 
taxpayer standing is “discoverable” and “manageable.”  Plainly, factor five, an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a prior political decision, is inapplicable to taxpayer 
standing—that factor is for such weighty matters as foreign policy and the prosecution of 
a war or armed conflict.  Factors four (due respect to coordinate branches of government) 
and six (potential for multiple pronouncements by various departments on one question) 
are also inapplicable to taxpayer standing—there is no other branch of government 
equipped to rule upon the constitutionality of a general assessment or tax expenditure, so 
there is no risk of multiple pronouncements or a lack of respect for coordinate branches. 
Factor one (textually demonstrable commitment to another branch) is inapplicable as the 
                                                     
109 See discussion infra Part III.D.2 (discussing possibility of political remedies in this situation). 
110 See Siegel, supra note 109, at 129-38 (considering a purpose-based approach to justiciability 
which preserves many of the traditional categories of justiciability).  
111 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  
112 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
113 U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865). 
114 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
115 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
116 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 379 (1988) (discussion of substantive due process).  
117 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (holding that the right of marital privacy 
is a “personal right ‘retained by the people’ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment”).  
118 Id. at 484 (holding “that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help to give them life and substance”).  
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Constitution does not obviously lodge responsibility on this matter in any branch, least of 
all the Legislative or Executive Branches. Finally, factor three (need for nonjudicial 
policy determination) is inapplicable—the court managed to rule upon the 
constitutionality of what amounts to the functional equivalent of a tax credit (Winn) in 
Flast without having to make any sort of non-judicial policy determination.
119
 
Given the inapplicability of the underlying rationale of the political question 
doctrine, to some of the underlying questions of taxpayer standing which would 
otherwise be rendered non-justiciable, there is good reason to think that a judicial remedy 
should exist. This is especially true where the political system is structurally ill-equipped 
to give a political remedy to the aggrieved taxpayer.
120
 
C. An Analogy to Ultra Vires Corporate Actions 
When a corporation has exceeded the legal authority granted to it by its charter, 
an ultra vires derivative action may be brought by shareholders to enjoin the conduct, or, 
in extreme cases, an action may be brought quo warranto by the State Attorney General 
to dissolve the corporation.
121
 Such an action protects minority interests in the 
corporation from being subjugated to those of the majority by allowing the minority party 
to step into the shoes of the corporation to enforce the guiding principles of the charter 
that govern their association.
122
 Not only can the minority shareholders bring a suit on 
behalf of the corporation to enjoin ultra vires conduct, it is a longstanding rule that an 
ultra vires action cannot be ratified by the shareholders of a corporation, as it was never 
within the authority of the corporation to engage in that conduct in the first place.
123
 This 
further protects minority shareholders from the intense pressure that the majority 
shareholders may use in the attempt to get minority shareholders to vote for ratification in 
order to cleanse the ultra vires conduct.  The rationale behind the procedural safeguards 
that have been put in place to enforce the rights of minority viewpoints in the corporate 
context applies, and with much greater force, to the constitutional question at hand.  
The Constitution, much like a corporate charter, governs the association between 
government (analogous to the directors and officers of a corporation) and citizens 
(analogous to shareholders).  While the Constitution is meant to preserve and promote 
democratic ideals, including that of majority rule, it contains an unmistakable counter-
majoritarian strain, which is meant to protect the interests of minority viewpoints.  
Amongst other things, these protections include the preservation of the right not to have 
to contribute to a government that establishes a religion.  If, in the corporate context, 
minority shareholders are empowered to enforce the guarantees of the foundational 
document that governs their association with other shareholders and with management by 
                                                     
119 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
120 This is incorporated into the test articulated in Part III.D, infra. 
121 Today, most corporations (other than municipal corporations) have as their purpose something 
like, ‘‘any lawful purpose . . .” As such, the only truly ultra vires action for these corporations is an illegal 
action. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on 
How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1307 (2001) 
(explaining the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in modern corporate law); Comment, Quo 
Warranto and Private Corporations, 37 YALE L.J. 237, 239 (1927) (relating quo warranto proceeding to the 
corporate context).    
122 See Greenfield, supra note 122, at 1304-07 (noting that the ultra vires doctrine protected 
shareholders by limiting corporate activities to those enumerated in the charter and that a sole dissenting 
shareholder could sue to enjoin ultra vires actions, even if all other shareholders assented).  
123 Cal. Nat’l Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 367 (1897) (citing both to American and English 
cases holding for the proposition that an ultra vires action cannot be ratified).  
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employing unique procedural mechanisms (the derivative action) and by enshrining 
counter-majoritarian principles into the fabric of corporate law (the idea that ultra vires 
actions cannot be ratified), then there is equal or better reason to protect citizens with 
minority viewpoints from violations of the foundational document that is the bedrock of 
our society by providing them with counter-majoritarian principles (the Establishment 
Clause) and unique procedural mechanisms (taxpayer standing).  
D. A New Theory of Taxpayer Standing 
This new theory of taxpayer standing conceives of all questions of standing as 
constitutional questions.  Insofar as an examination of standing requires pragmatism to be 
sensible at all, such considerations cannot be divorced from the project of constitutional 
interpretation — pragmatic concerns are baked into the analysis of whether the legal 
conclusions of “case” or “controversy” are affixed to a particular dispute, rendering it apt 
to adjudication in the courts.  This test for taxpayer standing is informed by pragmatic 
concerns, but it is not any more antithetical to constitutional interpretation than any other 
attempts to use pragmatism to define the boundaries of the standing doctrine.  
This is a more sensible route than separating “constitutional” from “pragmatic” 
types of standing requirements.  Separating those requirements, makes the doctrine even 
more complicated by imposing two different types of barriers, as the Court acknowledges 
it has done in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow.
124
 Forcing would-be litigants 
to jump through an additional hurdle not required by the Constitution to vindicate 
constitutional rights is simply improper.  If no pragmatic limitation can be found in 
Article III itself, it should not be imposed upon prospective plaintiffs.
125
  
Hence, this Note proposes the theory that taxpayer standing is appropriate where: 
(1) the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer bears a reasonable relationship to the expenditure 
of government funds in question; (2) it is of practical necessity because the political 
system is structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy for those who object to a 
particular expenditure of government funds alleged to violate the Constitution or the 
taxpayer is a member of the class for whom the especial benefit of a constitutional 
limitation is intended to directly run; and (3) where no other plausible party has standing 
to challenge the alleged violation, leaving it functionally irremediable.  
1. Reasonable Relationship to Challenged Expenditure 
The Flast test expresses broadly the same concerns as this first prong. It says that 
the taxpayer must do two things to have standing: (1) “establish a logical link between 
[status as a taxpayer] and the type of legislative enactment attacked”; and (2) “establish a 
nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement 
alleged.”126  The main problem with the Flast test is that it is turbid and confusing. The 
first part of the test is meant to express the idea that a party can only challenge exercises 
of the Taxing and Spending Clause of the Constitution. This part of the test is unclear and 
without a sound foundation.  As Justice Scalia and Justice Souter argue in Hein, whether 
the expenditure of government funds were to be effected by the Executive Branch, 
pursuant to a general appropriation, or the Legislative Branch as a direct exercise of the 
Taxing and Spending Power, the Establishment Clause (or any other part of the 
                                                     
124 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).  
125 But see Judge Posner, who appears to approve of these separate requirements, in American 
Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 650 F.3d. 652, 655-656 (7th Cir. 2011). 
126 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
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Constitution) can be violated just the same.
127
 In keeping with the criticism of the Winn 
decision articulated in Part II.C, courts should not exalt form over substance, especially 
when it may allow an end-run around the Establishment Clause. Were the legislature to 
give a general appropriation subject to executive discretion with full knowledge that the 
Executive Branch would use that money to violate the Establishment Clause, the courts 
should not be prevented from adjudging the expenditures to be unconstitutional 
regardless of formalistic distinctions.
128
 Even if such a scheme were not at issue, the fear 
expressed in Hein that the power of the judiciary would be improperly expanded by 
turning courts into constant monitors of governmental functions is ameliorated by the 
remaining two prongs of the test articulated in this Note.
129
 
The second prong of the Flast test incorporates the idea that “the taxpayer must 
show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed 
upon the exercise of the congressional Taxing and Spending Power and not simply that 
the enactment is generally beyond the power delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.”130 
This part of the test makes sense as a limitation on purely advisory opinions or as 
attempting to cabin the scope of taxpayer suits, such that taxpayers cannot challenge laws 
which have nothing to do with the use of their tax dollars.  It does not make sense, 
however, when used to limit the scope of taxpayer suits to only Establishment Clause 
challenges.  If taxpayer standing should not be permitted under parts of the Constitution 
other than the Establishment Clause, then the most rational way to find this limitation is 
not to argue that those other parts of the Constitution do not place specific limitations on 
the power of Congress under the Taxing and Spending Power.  Indeed, the other 
limitations contained within the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment, and all of the other parts of the Constitution place specific limitations upon 
Congress’ power, including their power under the Taxing and Spending Power.  The 
reason taxpayers should not be able to challenge laws which are alleged to violate those 
parts of the Constitution comes either (1) from the fact that a taxpayer’s status as a 
taxpayer does not bear a reasonable relationship to the challenged law (think of a law 
which allowed federal prosecutors to hold people to account for capital offenses without 
a presentment of indictment by Grand Jury, which is plainly in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, but which lacks a reasonable relationship to a taxpayer’s status qua 
taxpayer); or (2) from the fact that taxpayer standing is not necessary because a better 
party would have standing.  In sum, taxpayer standing may be appropriate only in cases 
of Establishment Clause violations, but that is not because other parts of the Constitution 
do not place specific limitations upon Congress’ power under the Taxing and Spending 
Power; rather, it is because either the challenged conduct bears no reasonable relationship 
to the plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer or taxpayer standing is unnecessary because of 
another party who would otherwise have standing.  
Requiring only that the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer bear a reasonable 
relationship to the challenged governmental expenditure does away with much of the 
confusion in the Flast test without sacrificing any of its animating spirit.  Additionally, it 
has the added benefit of avoiding the formalistic line-drawing which has led to the 
absurdity attendant to exalting form over substance.  Surveying some of the key cases in 
                                                     
127 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion). 
128 Hein, 551 U.S. at 618.  
129 See infra Parts III.D.2 and III.D.3 (giving the two other prongs of the test).  
130 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.  
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this area, like Winn,
131
 which presented a state tax credit alleged to violate the 
Establishment Clause, asking whether the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer bears a 
reasonable relationship to the challenged conduct yields a clear answer: yes.  In the Flast 
case,
132
 the use of government money to buy textbooks and otherwise support religious 
education bears a sufficiently reasonable relationship to the plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer 
to confer standing.  In Frothingham,
133
 although the Maternity Act may not present a 
particularly good case, the expenditure of government funds by an administrative agency 
bears a reasonable enough relationship to the plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer to confer 
standing.  In Hein,
134
 the President’s praise for religious-based organizations and 
speeches which used religious imagery, although perhaps costing the federal government 
something, did not bear a reasonable enough relationship to the plaintiff’s status as a 
taxpayer to confer standing.  A criticism might be leveled that this approach packs some 
elements of judgment on the merits of a case into this analysis, but merits are not always 
necessary to determine that a reasonable relationship does not exist and consideration of 
some of the merits may not always be unadvisable (this same criticism has been leveled 
at the Supreme Court’s pleading requirements jurisprudence).135  In Valley Forge,136 the 
transfer of government-owned real property to religious institutions is not different 
enough to justify denying standing, because real property requisitioned as part of a taking 
and compensated out of the federal coffers implicates the same interests so far as the 
taxpayer is concerned as other types of extraction and disposition. Remember, this survey 
of taxpayer standing cases has only been examined with regards to the first prong of this 
Note’s test—there may well be other reasons to deny standing that come from the other 
two prongs.  
2. Political Remedy 
The second prong of this test articulates that standing should be conferred where it is of 
practical necessity because the political system is ill-equipped to provide a remedy for 
those who object to a particular expenditure alleged to violate the Establishment Clause 
or any other part of the Constitution.  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged in its Equal Protection jurisprudence that 
insular or discrete minorities who lack political power sometimes merit additional 
protection in the form of intermediate or strict scrutiny.  The factors for granting 
heightened scrutiny were well collected by the Second Circuit in Windsor v. United 
States.
137
 The Second Circuit said that the following considerations are relevant: (1) 
“whether the class has been historically subjected to discrimination”; (2) “whether the 
                                                     
131 Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
132 Flast, 392 U.S. 83. 
133 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).  
134 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) 
135 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 
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STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (arguing that federal pleading standards are “in crisis”); Brian S. Clarke, Grossly 
Restricted Pleading: Twobly/Iqbal, Gross, and Cannibalistic Facts in Compound Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1101, 1141 (arguing that Twombly/Iqbal has effectively 
destroyed the viability of compound employment discrimination claims); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to 
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (arguing that our very 
democratic ideals are threatened by these decisions); and many others.  
136 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
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class has a defining characteristic that frequently bears a relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society”; (3) “whether the class exhibits obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group”; and (4) “whether the 
class is a minority or politically powerless.”138  This is not to say that immutability and 
political power are dispositive—minors and aliens deserve strict scrutiny despite either 
being mutable or having political power.  If the scales of justice can be manipulated in 
the final judgment on the basis of whether the party is a member of a discrete or insular 
minority, or otherwise merits such treatment, surely it is not too reaching to say that a 
pragmatic doctrine like standing should be sensitive to similar concerns.  
This part of the test should not be interpreted to say that just because it is difficult 
to obtain relief through the political system, this part is satisfied; rather, the requirement 
encompasses only those situations in which the political system is structurally ill-
equipped to provide a remedy, parallel to those situations in which insular or discrete 
minorities are thought to lack power in Equal Protection jurisprudence.  For example, the 
Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) 139  may well be difficult to repeal through the 
exercise of the political process and taxpayers may think that it is unconstitutional (and 
may still think so after The Health Care Cases),
140
 but that does not mean that the 
political system is structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy.  What is structurally ill-
equipped to provide a remedy in the context of this test is a nuanced point, but generally, 
when, as a result of the fact that a taxpayer is a member of an insular minority or has 
immutable qualities possessed by the relevant group to which he or she belongs (the 
group to which the Constitutional violation is particularly offensive) that taxpayer has 
less than the typical amount of political power.  Then, the taxpayer may not be able to get 
effective relief through the political process and the political system is structurally ill-
equipped to provide that relief.  
The foregoing is not meant to say that a plaintiff must necessarily be a member 
of an insular or identifiable minority in order for taxpayer standing to be proper.  In 
situations where the plaintiff is a member of the class for whom the especial benefit of a 
constitutional limitation is intended to directly run, taxpayer standing may be proper.  For 
example, those who object to the establishment of a national religion, despite being a 
member of the religion that the government intends to establish may satisfy the second 
prong of this test.  This is to be contrasted with the situation in Frothingham, where the 
taxpayer objected to the expenditure of federal funds in support of mothers.
141
 She was 
neither a member of an insular or identifiable minority for whom the political system was 
ill-equipped to provide a remedy, nor was she a member of the class for whom the 
especial benefit of the constitutional limitation she invoked (the Tenth Amendment) was 
intended to directly run (the direct benefit runs to the States, and then to the people, the 
ultimate beneficiary of all constitutional limitations).
142
 There are two ways of conceiving 
of such an approach: (1) that as a result of the specific constitutional limitation in 
question, it may be assumed that the dissenter is a member of a politically weak group for 
whom the constitutional limitation was put in place to protect; or (2) for those whom the 
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139 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 STAT. 119.  
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benefit was specially intended to directly run to, their interest in the enforcement of that 
constitutional limitation is particularly important and meaningful.  
This part of the test is meant to protect those groups for whom violations of the 
Constitution, especially the Establishment Clause, are particularly odious and for whom it 
would be difficult to effectively petition the political branches of government for relief. It 
is also meant to track the idea that taxpayer standing is a last resort of sorts, that should 
only be conferred when there is reason to suspect that constitutional violations will 
otherwise go un-remedied.  
Looking at key cases of interests, it is fairly clear that in Flast, Winn, and Valley 
Forge, the plaintiffs are members of the class for whom the benefit of the constitutional 
limitation embodied in the Establishment Clause was intended to run (and likely satisfied 
the structurally ill-equipped requirement, anyway).  In the Cuno case, an alleged violation 
of the Commerce Clause does not satisfy the second prong of this test, as the political 
system is adequately equipped to provide a remedy for improvident exercises of 
legislative power under the Commerce Clause, and the benefit was not intended to run to 
the plaintiffs in particular.
143
 The Court picked up this logic when it argued that 
“[w]hatever rights plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they are fundamentally 
unlike the right not to contribute three pence . . . for the support of any one religious 
establishment,” and disallowed a comparison between different parts of the Constitution 
at such a high level of generality as to sap them of all relevant differences.
144
  
3. Functional Irremediability 
The third prong of this test formulates the requirement that where no other 
plausible party has standing (and where the other two prongs of the test are met), 
taxpayer standing should be permitted because, otherwise, Constitutional violations 
would be left functionally irremediable.  
The Supreme Court has taken a dim view to this sort of argument, particularly in 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, where the Court said: “The assumption 
that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not reason to 
find standing.”145  In Valley Forge, the Court explained that position thusly: “Implicit in 
[this argument] is the philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correcting 
constitutional errors, and that ‘cases and controversies’ are at best merely convenient 
vehicles for doing so and at worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they 
become obstacles to that transcendent endeavor.”146  This argument is wrongheaded and 
cynical in the extreme both about taxpayer standing and the job of federal courts. Justice 
Rehnquist appears to be actively mocking the conception of the courts which holds that 
they serve a useful purpose in society by helping to correct errors in the foundational 
document meant to protect the freedoms of the people against the encroachments of the 
government.  
To say that the courts should not attempt to correct constitutional violations when 
possible, to imply that that is not a “transcendent” or worthy endeavor, or to argue that 
allowing taxpayer standing will bring down the system of checks and balances are all 
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specific limitation upon the State’s taxing and spending powers is incorrect—it most certainly does.  
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wrong and cynical.  If the guarantees of the Constitution are allowed to become a dead 
letter on the theory that insular minorities or those with unpopular viewpoints should only 
have recourse through the political system, a grave mistake has been made.  It is naïve to 
believe that the political system will listen to them; aggrieved taxpayers should not be 
forced to content themselves with the frustration and the false hope that politicians will 
fix their problems in order to get the full benefit of the rights to which they are entitled.  
This is not meant to imply that the case or controversy requirement embedded in 
Article III should be dispensed with wantonly when standing is difficult to find, or when, 
all things considered, no party should have standing to sue.  The case or controversy 
requirement undoubtedly serves a useful function in cases where the issues are moot, 
unripe, or where the parties are not actually adverse.  In cases like Winn, however, where 
the challenged expenditure bears a reasonable relationship to the taxpayer’s status as a 
taxpayer, and a political remedy is difficult to obtain, it is definitely relevant in analyzing 
the standing doctrine that no other party would have standing to challenge the 
government expenditure in question.  As has been argued, the question of standing should 
be (and, in fact, is) sensitive to pragmatic concerns,
147
 and insofar as this test formulates a 
practical concern that a constitutional violation would be allowed to go un-remedied 
because of formalism (even if it is useful formalism), the question of whether any party 
would have standing to challenge a government expenditure alleged to be 
unconstitutional is an important consideration.  This is not to say that solely because there 
is no party with standing, there should therefore be a judicial remedy; there are certainly 
situations in which general grievances about the conduct of government should not be 
entertained in the judiciary.  These cases are weeded out by various prongs of this Note’s 
test.  
4. Applying the Whole Test 
This section will apply the test formulated in this Note to the key cases in Part I.  
In summary, the test for taxpayer standing proposed here-in is as follows:  
1. The taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer bears a reasonable 
relationship to the expenditure of government funds in question, 
2. It is of practical necessity because the political system is 
structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy for those who 
object to a particular expenditure of government funds alleged to 
violate the Constitution, or the taxpayer is a member of the class 
for whom the especial benefit of a constitutional limitation is 
intended to directly run, and 
3. Where no other plausible party has standing to challenge the 
alleged violation, leaving it functionally irremediable. 
In Frothingham, the first important case on taxpayer standing, the taxpayer 
challenged the Maternity Act as a violation of the Tenth Amendment which would 
thereby deprive her of her property (via taxation) without due process of law.
148
 While 
the case is undoubtedly weak on constitutional grounds, prong (1) of this test is 
satisfied—the exercise of the Taxing and Spending Power to extract and spend money is 
undoubtedly reasonably related to the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer.  Where the case 
fails is in prong (2), as the political system is not structurally ill-equipped to remedy the 
                                                     
147 See supra notes 63-67 and 112-113.  
148 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
2014] A NEW THEORY OF TAXPAYER STANDING 143 
alleged violation (amongst other things, the States have an obvious interest in enforcing 
the limits of federalism), nor is Frothingham a member of the class to whom the especial 
benefit of the limitation laid out in the Tenth Amendment was intended to directly run.  
In Flast, the taxpayer challenged expenditures under the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to purchase materials for parochial schools as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.
149
  Prong (1) of this test is satisfied—the exercise 
of the Taxing and Spending Power to extract and spend money on materials for parochial 
schools is reasonably related to the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer.  Prong (2) of this test 
is also satisfied, as taxpayers are members of the class for whom the benefit of the 
Establishment Clause was intended to directly run.  Furthermore, the political system is 
ill-equipped to provide an effective remedy for those who object to the use of federal 
funds for parochial schools, because parochial schools are a deeply ingrained and tax-
preferred part of society.  Finally, prong (3) of this test is satisfied.  If taxpayers were to 
not have standing to challenge the expenditures, then no one would—certainly not the 
schools that receive the funds, probably not the schools that share the receipt of funds 
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 with the parochial schools, 
and likely not any other potential party.  
In Hein, the taxpayer challenged political speeches, rallies, and conferences 
which praised the good works of religious charities.
150
  It is difficult to draw a line at 
which point the use of federal dollars in connection with something having a religious 
character becomes large enough to bear a reasonable relationship to a taxpayer’s status as 
a taxpayer.  Challenging the praise of religious organizations’ good works which comes 
with associated de minimis costs
151
 (or is truly ancillary to the administration of a 
legitimate administrative program) fails prong (1) of this test.  Speeches and conferences 
which aim to reach out to religious organizations to help society function better and for 
which the main harm alleged is a symbolic one, simply do not create an injury that bears 
closely enough upon the taxpayer’s interest qua taxpayer.  To say otherwise would be to 
sap any meaning out of the “reasonable relationship” requirement in the first prong of the 
test.  It is a fact of society that the government must deal with religious organizations to 
maximize its effectiveness—not every such interaction rises to the level of concern to the 
taxpayer qua taxpayer.  
If however, prong (1) was satisfied, the suit fails on prong (2).  Although the 
plaintiffs at issue have the same character as those in Flast, merely being the especial 
beneficiary of the constitutional limitation is not always enough by itself, as such a status 
is part of the general proposition that the focus of the concern is that the political system 
is structurally ill-equipped to remedy the alleged violation.  As a result, when there is 
little reason to suspect that the political system is ill-equipped to remedy the alleged 
violation, but the plaintiff is part of the benefitted class (everyone for the Establishment 
Clause), taxpayer standing is not appropriate.  Here, there is little reason to believe that 
the political system is ill-equipped to remedy the Executive Branch’s partnership with 
religious organizations or positive rhetoric about them (there are elections after all).  
If, for the sake of argument, Hein’s plaintiff passes prong (2), then on prong (3), 
there is reason to think that if the taxpayers at issue do not have standing to sue, then no 
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one does (unless Congress itself had standing to sue over the Executive’s improper use of 
general appropriations funds).  If Hein’s plaintiff indeed passes this prong, and thereby 
the test, then maybe the test allows a borderline frivolous case to reach the courts.  This is 
not necessarily the worst result.  If the doctrine surrounding the Establishment Clause, 
born out of the idea that a taxpayer should not be forced to spend even three pence on the 
establishment of religion, does not occasionally permit borderline frivolous lawsuits, then 
either we have the perfect test on our hands or, more likely, we have one that is overly 
restrictive.  
In Valley Forge, the taxpayer challenged the transfer of real property owned by 
the government to religious institutions.
152
  Like it or not, prong (1) of this test is likely to 
be satisfied. Wary of the risk of exalting form over substance, it must follow that real 
property transfers to religious institutions can violate the Establishment Clause just as 
easily as the transfer of cash in the form of a subsidy or a tax expenditure.  Insofar as the 
transfers are not de minimis or a truly ancillary part of a legitimate regulatory regime, 
which they are not, they satisfy prong (1).  So far as prong (2) is concerned, there is little 
likelihood of a political remedy (no one is going to take away those pieces of land from 
the religious institutions to which they have been granted), and the taxpayers are the class 
for whom the Establishment Clause was intended to especially benefit. On prong (3), no 
one else would have standing to challenge the transfer of land to the religious institutions:  
Those who were excluded from the program likely lack a cognizable claim and those 
religious institutions themselves who were awarded land have suffered no injury.  
Although it is undesirable to have the judiciary meddling in how the federal government 
disposes of wartime property gained through eminent domain, there is a countervailing 
interest in seeing that such disposal does not turn into the tacit establishment of religion 
through transfers under the guise of merely enacting a necessary government divestment 
function.  
In the Cuno case, taxpayers challenged the award of a state tax credit to 
incentivize car companies to stay in Toledo, Ohio under a theory of State law similar to a 
challenge under the Commerce Clause.
153
  On prong (1), significant tax breaks to 
automobile companies certainly bear a reasonable relationship to the taxpayer’s status 
qua taxpayer. Where the case fails, however, is prong (2).  There, it makes little sense to 
say that the government is structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy because the 
plaintiff is a member of an insular or discrete minority or that the plaintiff taxpayer 
possesses an unusually strong interest in personally enforcing the Commerce Clause (as 
the benefit of the Commerce Clause only indirectly flows to the taxpayer; recall the 
criticism of high level abstraction in Cuno).
154
 
In Winn, the taxpayer challenged a state tax credit alleged to be in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.
155
 Tax expenditures like the tax credits at issue are the functional 
equivalents of subsidies, and are therefore reasonably related to the taxpayer’s status as a 
taxpayer. Hence, Prong (1) is satisfied. Prong (2) of this test is satisfied for exactly the 
same reasons as it was in Flast.
156
  Finally, prong (3) of this test is satisfied—the Acting 
Solicitor General, arguing as amicus curiae in support of the petitioner, Arizona School 
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Tuition Organization, acknowledged that there would be no party with standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the scheme, and there is really no reason to doubt that 
assertion.
157
  As Justice Ginsburg shrewdly pointed out, “the underlying premise of Flast 
v. Cohen [is] that the Establishment Clause will be unenforceable unless we recognize 
taxpayer standing.”158  The decision in Winn is a step towards formalism that erects a 
barrier making the enforcement of the Establishment Clause more difficult.  Rather than 
allow the Establishment Clause to rot on the paper on which it was written, permitting 
taxpayer standing when the three prongs of this test are met is a rational and fair way of 
balancing Article III’s case or controversy requirement and the necessity that the 
guarantees contained within the Constitution come to fruition.  
E. Shortcomings of the Test 
It might fairly be said that this test will not provide a more usable framework 
than the Flast test (and will invite the same problems of indeterminacy) because it is 
more complicated and because it asks for a greater weighing of pragmatic factors 
traditionally eschewed by judges.  While this may be true, the fact remains that the Flast 
test simply does not work, and insofar as this test attempts to respond to the underlying 
concerns that motivated the initial formulation of taxpayer standing and allows taxpayers 
meaningful access to relief from alleged constitutional violations, it would be a step 
forward in taxpayer standing jurisprudence.  What is more, it would not be unduly 
difficult to administer. Although each prong presents a separate difficulty (Does the 
expenditure bear a reasonable relationship?  Is a political remedy highly unlikely as a 
matter of structural factors?  Would the wrong be functionally irremediable?), it is not 
beyond the capabilities of judges to grasp the core concerns that have motivated the 
doctrine of taxpayer standing and apply a test better tailored to those issues.  At the end 
of the day, is it preferable to debate the metaphysics of a government program in the 
attempt to see whether we can fairly infer a nexus between that program and the taxpayer, 
or are we better served by asking ourselves whether challenges of government 
expenditures, regardless of how they come, bear a reasonable relationship to a taxpayer’s 
status as a taxpayer, and if so, whether we would be depriving taxpayers of needed relief 
from alleged violations of their constitutional rights by denying standing?  To vindicate 
the rights and protections in the Constitution, we are better off with the latter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of taxpayer standing is a historical departure from the general 
doctrine of standing.  Specifically, in that it can be read to loosen certain traditional 
requirements of standing (for example, the injury need not be quite so immediate and 
particular and there is some reason to be dubious about the effectiveness of the relief in 
reducing tax liability).  However, it is not a departure from the more deeply rooted and 
general principle that every violation of the Constitution should, in principle, have a 
remedy which is reasonably accessible (whether that be political or judicial).
159
 The Flast 
test as applied in Winn deprived taxpayers of any practical remedy. To hold that taxpayer 
                                                     
157 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Ariz. Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
158 Id. At 8. 
159 This is to be distinguished from the idea that every wrong in society has a Constitutional 
remedy, a proposition for which there is ample authority to doubt. See, e.g., Mueller v. Gallina, 311 F. Supp. 
2d 606, 609 (2004). The law is clearly not intended to punish every violation of the moral law. However, 
every violation of the federal Constitution should, in principle, has a remedy contemplated by the 
Constitution, unless the guarantees of the document are drained of any meaning. This remedy need not be 
judicial.  
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standing is effectively barred is to deny taxpayers a necessary outlet for remedying 
constitutional violations.  The Constitution has been read to impose a system of checks 
and balances where the judiciary plays a crucial role in ensuring that the rights of average 
citizens are not unduly infringed upon.  In cases such as Winn and Flast, taxpayers who 
are denied standing have no reasonable political alternative and thus are denied any 
effective relief from abuse in our constitutional system.  
While the Flast test might be broken, there is still good reason to have a narrow 
doctrine that sometimes permits standing which arises solely out of a taxpayer’s status as 
a taxpayer.  The new test of taxpayer standing proposed in this Note attempts to pick up 
the animating spirit of the Flast decision, while avoiding some of the interpretive hurdles 
and apparent confusion that plague it.  A more nuanced and comprehensive approach 
makes it unnecessary to go to the extremes that have led some to suggest that taxpayer 
standing should not exist at all.  Under this Note’s test, taxpayer standing is appropriate 
when three factors are met: (1) the taxpayer’s status as a taxpayer bears a reasonable 
relationship to the expenditure of government funds in question; (2) it is of practical 
necessity because the political system is structurally ill-equipped to provide a remedy for 
those who object to a particular expenditure of government funds alleged to violate the 
Constitution, or the taxpayer is a member of the class for whom the especial benefit of a 
constitutional limitation is intended to directly run; and (3) where no other plausible party 
has standing to challenge the alleged violation, leaving it functionally irremediable. 
If applied, this new test would do away with some of the useless formalism that 
has arisen as a result of the Flast decision, provide a clearer picture of the underlying 
concerns motivating the doctrine of taxpayer standing, and still provide necessary judicial 
relief for violations of the Constitution, especially the Establishment Clause, which 
would otherwise be functionally irremediable.   
